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ABSTRACT
It is often argued that branching stabilizes banking systems by facilitating diversification of bank
portfolios; however, previous empirical research on the Great Depression offers mixed support for
this view. Analyses using state-level data find that states allowing branch banking had lower failure
rates, while those examining individual banks find that branch banks were more likely to fail. We
argue that an alternative hypothesis can reconcile these seemingly disparate findings. Using data on
national banks from the 1920s and 1930s, we show that branch banking increases competition and
forces weak banks to exit the banking system. This consolidation strengthens the system as a whole
without necessarily strengthening the branch banks themselves. Our empirical results suggest that
the effects that branching had on competition were quantitatively more important than geographical
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Branch Banking, Bank Competition, and Financial Stability 
 
One of the foundations of the theoretical literature on banking regulation is that 
branch banking leads to more stable banking systems by enabling banks to better 
diversify their assets and widen their depositor base (Gart 1994, Hubbard 1994). This 
conventional wisdom has been used to argue that historical banking crises in the United 
States, especially those of the 1930s, would have been less severe had the U.S. permitted 
widespread branch banking (Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Calomiris 2000). The 
empirical literature examining U.S. banking instability during the Great Depression, 
however, has not universally confirmed this prediction. In fact, this research presents a 
paradox. Studies using aggregate bank failure data from the Depression find that states 
that allowed branch banking had lower failure rates than those that only allowed unit (or 
single-office) banking (Wheelock 1995, Mitchener 2000a, 2004); although the result is 
consistent with the diversification hypothesis, these studies do not test the precise channel 
through which branching reduced failures. In contrast, studies using individual bank data 
from the same period cast doubt on the common view that the stabilizing benefits of 
branching operated via increased diversification opportunities. Calomiris and Mason 
(2000) and Carlson (2004) find that banks with branches were more likely to fail than 
unit banks, in part because they pursued strategies to reduce reserves rather than to 
diversify their portfolios.  
In this paper, we resolve this empirical puzzle by focusing on an additional 
channel through which branch banking could affect financial stability: increased 
competition. Our hypothesis is that, faced with heightened competition, banks that are 
only marginally profitable are forced out of the banking system either through merger or 
voluntary liquidation. As these weaker banks close, the overall stability of a state’s 
banking system improves through consolidation. Thus, in the 1920s and 1930s, states   2
allowing branch banking experienced lower failure rates without the branch banks 
themselves necessarily being the strongest banks. 
Our hypothesis draws on the theoretical and empirical literature that examines the 
removal of legal restrictions on competition, and then links it to the literature on bank 
failures. Although policymakers often debate whether there are tradeoffs between 
competition and stability, surprisingly little theoretical or empirical research has analyzed 
these linkages in depth (Allen and Gale 2000).
1 Consistent with the hypothesis posited 
here, Berger and Hannan (1998) find that banks not exposed to competition are able to 
exercise monopoly power and tend to be less efficient than banks subject to more 
competition. When laws restricting competition are relaxed, bank profits generally 
decline. This has been found both within the United States (Amel and Liang 1997) and 
internationally (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 1998, Levine 1996). Moreover, 
the increase in competition resulting from the removal of branching restrictions has been 
linked to the weeding out of weak banks (Jayaratne and Strahan 1998, Stiroh and Strahan 
2003). We similarly argue that the expansion of branching in the 1920s facilitated an 
increase in competition. To help clarify the theoretical debate over the effects of 
competition on financial stability, we directly test how the growth of branching 
influenced bank competition and how this in turn affected bank failures. 
Since our hypothesis emphasizes changes in the competitive environment induced 
by the onset of branch banking, it is necessary to test our model using data from a period 
when branch banking was expanding in scope. Moreover, because we want to test how 
branching influences the stability of banking systems, we also need to examine a period 
when there were numerous failures. In this respect, the experience of the U.S. banking 
system from 1920-30 is ideal since branching was expanding rapidly (Figure 1), and 
                                                 
1 “On the one hand, there are many models of competition in the literature including models of bank 
regulation in a competitive environment. On the other hand, there is a well-developed literature on bank 
crises…But there is little on the impact of competition on stability.” (Allen and Gale, 2000, p.268). 
Important exceptions are Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) and Matutes and Vives (1998); however, this 
newer theoretical literature presents conflicting views on how competition affects financial stability.     3
because the 1920s were characterized by a large number of bank failures (Figure 2).
2 
Finally, examining this period allows us to compare our results to existing research on the 
Great Depression and resolve the paradox that currently exists in the literature.  
Our hypothesis has several testable propositions. First, the expansion of branching 
should change the competitive environment. If branch banking removes weaker banks 
from a banking system, then states permitting branch banking should experience higher 
merger and voluntary liquidation rates and lower entry rates (by new banks) than states 
prohibiting it. Second, over time more competition in states permitting branch banking 
should result in lower profit levels. Finally, if the competitive shakeout induced by 
branching stabilizes banking systems by removing weak banks from the system, then in 
the long run failure rates should be lower in states where branch banking was expanding. 
The link between branching, competition, and stability ought to be present even after 
controlling for any benefits to stability coming from improved geographical 
diversification of bank portfolios. We draw on the bifurcated nature of the dual banking 
system that existed in the 1920s to design a statistical test to discriminate between the 
effects of geographical diversification and competition due to branching.  
Our empirical results support the predictions of the competition hypothesis. States 
in which branching was more prevalent experienced more mergers and voluntary 
liquidations during the 1920s. We also find that, although there was significant 
consolidation in the banking sector in states allowing widespread branch banking, profits 
were lower on average in these states, suggesting that branching led to increased 
competition rather than monopoly power. To test whether branching reduced failures, we 
first confirm that our data produce the usual state-level result that states allowing 
branching or those with more branch offices had lower failure rates. We then construct 
                                                 
2 Chapman and Westerfield (1942) describe how the issue of branch banking gained national attention 
during the 1920s, in part because it was spreading rapidly in states such as California and prompting federal 
regulators to reconsider their longstanding prohibitions against it.    4
proxies for the portfolio diversification and competition channels of branching and test 
whether their inclusion affects this result. Our econometric evidence shows that, at least 
for national banks, the consolidation effects were quantitatively more important than 
increased portfolio diversification opportunities for banking stability during this period. 
These results suggest that, at the onset of the Great Depression, there were still many 
weak banks in states prohibiting branch banking; the real shock of the 1930s caused 
many of these to fail. However, in states that permitted branching, weak banks had been 
pruned from the system, and failures were consequently lower at the systemwide level. 
Thus we resolve the paradox in the existing literature by showing that the expansion of 
branching improved stability at the statewide level through the competitive shakeout 
process without necessarily improving individual banks’ ability to diversify away risk 
during a large shock such as the Great Depression. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the previous literature on 
branching and financial stability. In section 3, we present our hypothesis for resolving the 
existing puzzle in the literature. The next section tests the consolidation hypothesis and 
some of its implications for bank competition and financial stability. Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks. 
 
Section 2.  The Effects of Branch Banking on Financial Stability 
  
An argument commonly articulated in the literature is that branch banking 
stabilizes banking systems by reducing their vulnerability to local economic shocks: 
branching enables banks to diversify their loans and deposits over a wider geographical 
area or customer base.
3 Restrictions on branching have been linked to the instability of 
banking systems. Calomiris (2000) argues that bank failures were more prevalent in 
                                                 
3 Studies by Wacht (1968) and Lauch and Murphy (1970) find reduced variance in deposit flows for branch 
banks. Cherin and Melcher (1988) find that branching has moderating effects on asset returns.   5
regions of the United States without branch banking as well as in countries lacking it. 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) suggest that the absence of branching in the U.S. 
increased the severity of the banking panics during the Great Depression. Moreover, they 
argue that the U.S. experience stands in contrast to Canada, which experienced banking 
distress during the Depression but not widespread failures and a collapse of its banking 
system.
4 The notion that branch banking stabilizes banking systems by increasing 
diversification opportunities is in fact an argument with old roots (Sprague 1903). In the 
1920s, proponents of branch banking used this argument to encourage state legislatures to 
adopt laws legalizing branch banking (Preston 1924, Southworth 1928). 
  Research examining the effects of branching at the aggregate level generally 
supports the hypothesis that allowing branch banking increases systemic stability. 
Wheelock (1995) studies the effects of different state banking regulations on bank 
failures during the Depression and finds that states that allowed branch banking tended to 
have lower failure rates. Mitchener (2000a, 2004) further examines state- and county-
level bank failure rates. Controlling for economic fundamentals and differences in both 
state supervision and regulation, he also finds that states with legalized branching had 
lower failure rates during the Depression. Comparing 25 different countries during the 
Great Depression, Grossman (1994) finds that countries with large branching networks 
were less likely to experience banking crises.
5 Although the studies that rely on aggregate 
data find a positive correlation between branch banking and financial stability, they do 
not establish the precise channel through which branching improved stability.
6 It is 
                                                 
4 Drummond (1991) and White (1983) make a similar argument. Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993), 
however, find that nationwide branch banking did not prevent banks in Canada from becoming technically 
insolvent. 
5 Many of these studies also include some measure of bank concentration as an explanatory variable. 
Although none of them provides an interaction term for branch banking and their measure of concentration, 
it is possible that these two effects worked together to influence failure rates. In section 4, we relate our 
consolidation hypothesis to the issue of banking concentration. Our emphasis, however, differs in that we 
are testing whether changes in bank concentration are an outcome of branching laws and whether this in 
turn affected bank profitability.  
6 Wheelock (1995) attributes the positive correlation between restrictions on branch banking and failure 
rates to limited diversification. Similarly Alston, Grove, and Wheelock (1994) also consider the impact of   6
therefore possible that the stability effects of branching are related to something besides 
or in addition to diversification. 
  Studies using data on individual banks operating in the 1920s and 1930s paint a 
different picture of the effects that branching has on the survivorship of individual banks, 
and they cast doubt on the common view that the stabilizing benefits of branching 
operated via increased diversification opportunities. Calomiris and Mason (2000) find 
that, during the Depression, Federal Reserve members that were branch banks tended to 
fail sooner than unit banks. Also, using data on individual state banks from this period, 
Carlson (2004) examines three states where branch banking was relatively widespread 
and finds that branched banks were more likely to fail than unit banks. Furthermore, he 
rejects some potential reasons for this phenomenon, including insufficient diversification 
and over-expansion on the part of banks. Instead, he finds that branch banks used 
diversification to reduce their reserves rather than to lower the risk of their portfolios – a 
strategy that worked poorly during the global shock of the Great Depression.  
Because it is difficult to reconcile the findings based on aggregate data (which 
report a negative relationship between bank failures and statewide branch banking) with 
the empirical results from studies using individual bank data (which are inconsistent with 
the view that the source of stability was improved opportunities for diversification), this 
article proposes an additional channel through which branching could have affected 
stability: competition. Although they do not construct a formal model, Berger, Demsetz, 
and Strahan (1998) argue that increased competition results in the purging of inefficient 
banks from the banking system. Consistent with these ideas, Jayaratne and Strahan 
(1998) and Stiroh and Strahan (2003) find that the branch-banking reform that began in 
the United States in the 1980s resulted in the removal of weaker banks from the system. 
                                                                                                                                                 
branching legislation on bank failures, and emphasize that branching may reduce a bank’s susceptibility to 
distress in a particular area; however, they do not find that the ratio of (non-home-office) branches to total 
banks helps to explain the cross-state variation in failure rates during the 1920s.   7
Additionally, Koskela and Stenbacka (2000) suggest that greater competition decreases 
interest rates and increases the likelihood that borrowers are able to remain solvent and 
repay their loans. These studies suggest that the introduction of competition (in our case, 
driven by the growth of branch banking) may improve the stability of banking systems. 
On the other hand, Matutes and Vives (1998) argue that raising the level of competition 
causes an increase in failures as lower profits resulting from competition encourage banks 
to take on more risk.
7 We are not aware of any previous studies that systematically test 
the effects of competition on the stability of banking systems in particular.
8 
 
Section 3. Branch Banking and Competition in the 1920s 
 
As figure 1 shows, the total number of branches operated in the United States 
nearly tripled between 1920 and 1930, rising from 1,281 to 3,518. Many of these 
branches were located in home-office cities and the number of these branches more than 
doubled, increasing from 508 in 1920 to 1,131 in 1930 (Federal Reserve 1931, vol. 2). 
We hypothesize that this expansion of branching networks increased the level of 
competition in states that allowed branching to occur. As a result of this dynamic process, 
banks that were only marginally profitable prior to the increase in competition would 
become unprofitable due to the increase in competition. In turn, these banks would likely 
merge with existing banks or voluntarily liquidate.
9 Also, because it is less costly to open 
a branch than a new bank, it is likely that fewer new banks would be able to find an 
unexploited profitable niche and enter the market despite the fact that regulatory barriers 
                                                 
7 Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find that consolidation for bank holding companies (BHCs) enhanced 
diversification following regulatory reform in 1994, but that larger BHCs then operated with lower capital 
ratios and increased their risky lending. 
8 Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002), however, compare broad financial systems of different countries 
between the early 1970s and the late 1990s and find that, although reducing barriers to external competition 
initially results in some turmoil, the long run effect of deregulation is increased stability. 
9 Wheelock and Wilson (2000) find that, during the 1980s and 1990s, inefficiency reduced the likelihood 
that a bank would be acquired.  Carlson (2001), however, finds that during the early 1930s, acquired banks 
were generally weaker than other banks.    8
to entry have been removed. With the exit of the weakest banks, the economic viability of 
the average bank would increase and the rate of failure for banks within that state would 
decline.
10  The idea that the removal of barriers to competition would lead to a reduction 
in the number of banks in the banking system is consistent with the model by 
Economides, Hubbard, and Palia (1996). 
Why should these competitive forces apply to the introduction of new branches 
(as a result of legal changes) and not simply to the emergence of new unit banks in the 
1920s? First, banks with branches were more cost-effective, since some jobs at different 
branches could be consolidated and performed at the head office, thus reducing 
employment costs (Federal Reserve 1931, vol. 2, p. 224.)  Also, start-up costs were 
lower, and in some states, regulators required less capital for new branches than for new 
unit banks (Southworth 1928). Second, new branches that were set up in previously 
restricted markets may have been more adept at realizing higher rates of return than 
comparable new unit banks since branches could transfer deposits out of the local market 
to regions where capital was in higher demand.
11 The ability to obtain a cost advantage 
through branching and realize higher rates of return made entry into existing local 
markets easier for branch banks than new unit banks. Indeed, branch banking may have 
been instrumental in bringing banking and banking competition to small towns. Calomiris 
(2000, Chapter 1) makes a similar argument. In 1931 (the only year for which we have so 
far been able to locate the distribution of branches by town size), nearly half of all 
branches outside the home-office city were located in towns of less than 2,500 people 
(Table 1).  Figure 3 shows the locations of branches outside the home-office city. 
                                                 
10 By limiting the development of secondary markets, entry barriers such as restrictions on branching could 
also prevent productive assets of weak banks from being digested or taken over by more efficient banks. 
Without the existence of local competition to absorb bank assets, weak banks may have been forced to sell 
productive assets in thin markets at fire sale prices or not at all, in turn increasing the likelihood of bank 
failures within the system.  
11 Morgan, Rime, and Strahan (2003) provide another channel through which diversified banks improve 
stability – shifting capital between regions to dampen economic shocks.   9
  Laws that permitted statewide branching applied only to state-chartered banks 
(which were regulated by state banking departments) while the data used below to test 
this hypothesis are for national banks (which were regulated by the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency). The logic of our hypothesis, however, still applies to 
national banks since they would be subject to increased competition from the state banks 
that were allowed to establish branches.
12 Indeed, it may actually be better for testing the 
competition hypothesis since the vast majority of national banks had no branches outside 
the home-office city over our period and therefore enjoyed no effective geographical 
diversification benefits. Excluding California, the country's nearly 8,000 nationally 
chartered banks operated 18 branches outside the home-office city in 1925. In 1930 this 
number was 27 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 1943). Since our sample consists of 
national banks, and only a few of them branch outside the headquarter city, any observed 
or unobserved channels through which branching might affect both competition and 
diversification are likely to be less of a problem. Finally, using a sample consisting of 
national banks has the additional advantage that the regulatory environment and the 
attitudes of regulators regarding bank mergers were more uniform than those concerning 
state banks.  
It has been shown by Calomiris and Mason (2000), among others, that less 
profitable banks were more likely to fail during the Great Depression. A key component 
of our hypothesis is that in the long run fewer of these banks would exist in states that 
allowed branch banking, because the competitive pressures associated with the rise of 
branch banking networks prior to the Depression would have forced weak banks to exit 
from the banking system earlier in the decade. In states without the competitive pressures 
of branch banking, more weak banks would still exist at the start of the Depression and 
                                                 
12 Additionally, state banks that converted into national banks were permitted to keep branches they had 
established while they were state banks, enabling branch banks to become national banks through a legal 
technicality.   10
these states would therefore have more banks that would be likely to fail during the 
subsequent downturn. This interpretation is consistent with the findings in Mitchener 
(2000a, 2004) and Wheelock (1995): states allowing branch banking had lower failure 
rates than those prohibiting it. And it would also be true even though it was not 
necessarily the case that branch banks were the survivors. 
The alternative hypothesis, that a banking system with branching is more 
diversified and therefore more stable than a banking system with only unit banks, 
presupposes that the two systems are in equilibrium. The banking system of the United 
States during the 1920s and 1930s, however, was in the process of transition. As noted 
above, branching was expanding rapidly in some states and the total number of banks 
was declining steadily from 29,715 in June 1920 to 23,855 by June 1930 (Federal 
Reserve 1943). The growth in branch banking during the 1920s was facilitated by a 
variety of legal and technological changes. In 1922, the Comptroller ruled that national 
banks could, “under the law, establish agencies, teller windows, or additional offices 
within the city of the parent bank provided state banks were permitted to operate 
branches in that state (Chapman and Westerfield, 1942, p.97),” although these offices 
could not issue loans and were not full-fledged branches. Possibly seeing these offices as 
one step away from approval by the Comptroller of full-fledged branch banking for 
national banks, state banks may have responded by increasing their branching networks 
in order to compete with national banks. Relationships with correspondents were 
weakened due to amendments of the Federal Reserve Act in 1917 (which put check 
clearing in the hands of the Federal Reserve and required national banks to hold their 
entire reserve requirement at the Federal Reserve), possibly inducing banks to pursue the 
loss of deposits by buying banks and converting them to branches. Dramatic 
improvements in road networks and improvements in telephone networks likely 
improved the ability of managers to oversee branch networks. And rising urbanized 
populations in the newer cities of Los Angeles and Detroit (both augmented by the rise of   11
the automobile, the former via the conversion of rails to roads and the latter which served 
as the industry’s manufacturing hub) also led to an increase in demand for banking 
services. Both cities realized dramatic increases in the number of branch banking offices 
in the 1920s. It is also likely that more banks were willing to develop branch networks 
during the 1920s as they observed the success of branch banks in places such as 
California.
13 It is this structural change in the banking system wrought by these factors 
that motivates our hypothesis. The key role played by this change in the banking system 
suggests that our explanation is specific to the United States and may not apply to other 
economies during the 1920s, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, which had 
removed barriers to branching earlier and likely had completed the transition to a branch 
banking system. That is, as branching expanded rapidly in some U.S. states in the 1920s 
shakeout took place, initially causing exit and later reducing bank failures. 
Because the growth in branching is attributable largely to shifts in the 
relationships of banks with each other, technological progress, and population/economic 
growth rather than changes in regulation specifically concerning branching, we use 
changes in actual branching activity over time, and across states, rather than changes in 
branching laws, to examine the effect of branching on a state’s banking system.  We 
argue that using actual branches provides a more complete picture of the effect that 
branching might have on the competitive environment because the laws regulating the 
establishment of branches varied substantially so that variables categorizing regulations 
capture quite different situations.
14 
                                                 
13 California’s branching network developed more quickly and extensively than any other state in the 
decade, in part due the financial entrepreneur, A.P. Giannini, who created an extensive branching network 
for the Bank of America. This spurred competing large banks in California to develop branching networks, 
especially in Los Angeles, to fight Bank of America’s geographical expansion. Given the size of Bank of 
America’s branching network in California, a change in its charter in 1927 (from state to national) could 
have a large impact on the results in our paper, so later we test whether our results on stability are sensitive 
to its inclusion.  
14 For example: Massachusetts allowed trust companies to have one branch in the same city as the home 
office; New York allowed unlimited branching in the city of the bank’s home office if the population of the 
city exceeded 50,000; Louisiana allowed banks to have up to two branches, which could be located in the 
parish of the home office; and California allowed statewide branching.   12
One notable change in the legal environment in the 1920s was the McFadden Act 
of 1927, which allowed national banks to establish local branches in the city of their 
home office if state law allowed branching. However, the Act imposed several 
restrictions: national banks could open no new branches in cities with fewer than 25,000 
people, only two branches in cities with populations between 50,000 and 100,000, and at 
the discretion of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency for cities of over 100,000 
(Tippetts, 1929).  
It should be noted that the expansion of branching (and consequently the 
consolidation of the banking system) in the 1920s, which was driven by the establishment 
of the Federal Reserve, technological changes, population growth, and economic growth, 
is quite different from expansion of branching in the 1980s and 1990s, which appears to 
have been more strongly influenced by changes in regulation (Stiroh and Strahan 2003, 
Kroszner and Strahan 1998). Thus, focusing on a measure of branching activity is likely 
to better capture the effect of branching on the banking system during the 1920s than the 
shifts in regulation that have played a prominent role in dealing with the expansion of 
branching in recent periods. 
Our hypothesis, which emphasizes how the expansion of branch banking within a 
state increases the competitive pressures on inefficient banks and can induce them to 
merge or voluntarily liquidate, is consistent with recent research examining the effects of 
bank deregulation (DeYoung, Hasan, and Kirchoff 1998, Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan 
1999, Jayaratne and Strahan 1998, Stiroh and Strahan 2003). However, it stands in 
contrast to one of the longstanding populist arguments lodged against branch banking. 
Opponents of branch banking have often complained that it was a form of cartelization 
that would result in consolidation of the industry and reduced competition, and that its 
growth would reduce the viability of businesses in small communities by siphoning funds   13
to urbanized areas. Such sentiments were widely expressed in the first quarter of the 20
th 
century when branching was spreading rapidly.
15  
While the growth of branch banking may lead to consolidation, the effects on 
competition are not as clear as opponents of branching suggest. In fact, the economic 
theory or private-interest view of regulation argues that branching restrictions are used to 
protect inefficient, local monopolies and restrict competition.
16 The result of these 
intrastate regulations was less than full-scale competition in local deposit and loan 
markets. Chapman and Westerfield (1942, p.233) described the situation in the 1920s and 
1930s: 
 
“Country bankers foresee danger to themselves in the possibility of 
inroads into their areas of operation, should the larger institutions of the 
cities be permitted to establish branches and compete with them in their 
area on equal terms. They know that such a policy would result in a 
reduction of interest rates in their towns and that their chances for the 
profitable use of their funds might be somewhat diminished unless they 
were prepared to go as far as their new rivals in serving customers 
cheaply. The alleged apprehension of unit bankers as to the monopolistic 
character of branch banking is, to say the least, selfish. What really 
motivates them is their desire to preserve their local monopolies and 
escape the competition of the more effective branch banks.” 
  
Our hypothesis is sympathetic to this view of regulatory impediments. It is also 
analogous to one that has been made in the context of the global financial services 
industry: just as foreign banks have brought necessary competition to inefficient domestic 
markets (Levine 1996, Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 1998, Folkerts-Landau 
and Lindgren 1998), branch banking can introduce greater competition to local markets, 
improving the cost and delivery of services to customers and the safety of the banking 
system by forcing inefficient banks to merge or go out of business.  
 
                                                 
15 See, for example, the discussion in Chapman and Westerfield (1942, p.10) for examples of this view. 
16 See Kroszner and Strahan (1998, 2000), Mitchener (2000c), and Chapman and Westerfield (1942).    14
Section 4. Testing the Competition/Consolidation Hypothesis 
 
  This section tests several predictions of our hypothesis, using data on national 
banks from the 1920s and the first two years of the Depression. First, we test whether the 
number of mergers and voluntary liquidations was higher (and the number of entries by 
new banks was lower) in states where there was more branch-banking activity. We then 
test whether other factors related to competition and consolidation, including the number 
of banks per capita and the profitability of different banks, are related to the extent of 
branch banking in a state. Finally, we test whether competition, induced by branching, is 
better at accounting for the variation in failure rates across states than the diversification 
argument. 
 
A. Mergers, Voluntary Liquidations, and Entry in Branch Banking States 
  
Our first test examines industry consolidation – whether there were more mergers 
and voluntary liquidations for national banks in states that allowed branch banking – and 
whether there were also fewer new banks established in these states.
17 Table 2 
summarizes the rate of entry of new national banks and rates of exits of national banks 
over the sample period of 1922-30 and groups by whether states permitted branch 
banking. (Appendix Table 1 describes the sources for our data. Detailed information on 
state branching laws is shown in Appendix Table 2.) As the last column of the table 
shows, during the 1920s, states permitting some form of branching averaged somewhat 
more mergers and voluntary liquidations than states that prohibited branching.  
                                                 
17 Wheelock (1993, p.815) suggests that these changes may have occurred in the 1920s, but does not 
formally test this notion: “Like most Midwestern states, Kansas was a unit banking state during the 1920s, 
with over 1,000 small banks in operation…Had branching restrictions been removed those counties might 
have experienced greater consolidation, through either mergers or failures.”   15
The tabular results for the effects of branching on consolidation are tested more 
formally by regressing the number of exits and entries of national banks on a measure for 
branching activity in the state. Using observations on each state i, we estimate the 
following function:  
 
(1) COMPETITIONi = f{β1BRANCHi + β2BANKS/CAPi + β3AGRYi + β4DEPINSi + 
         β5BANKSi}, 
 
where  COMPETITION is specified as: (1) the number of mergers, (2) voluntary 
liquidations, or (3) new branches for national banks.
18 BRANCH is a measure of the 
extent of branching in the state; BANKS/CAP is the number of state and national banks 
per person, AGRY is the share of a state’s income from agriculture in 1920, BANKS is the 
log number of national banks, and DEPINS is a dummy variable that equals one for states 
with deposit insurance systems.  
Since exits and entries take on discrete integer values and are bounded below by 
zero, we analyze the number of exits and entries employing count data analysis, where 
the data are pooled across states. Count data analysis assumes that the dependent variable 
was generated through a Poisson process. Determining the effect of the independent 
variables shown in equation (1) involves maximizing the log-likelihood function: 
 





i i i i y X X y
1
' ' ! ln exp ) ( L ln β β β ,  
where y is the dependent variable vector, X is the matrix of independent variables, β is the 
coefficient vector, and n is the number of observations.
19 When analyzing counts, it is 
                                                 
18 It should be noted that entry of national banks is an imperfect measure of total entry, as one would also 
expect that the entry of state banks would be affected by branching. Additionally, some banks may prefer to 
enter the banking system as state banks in states allowing branching in order to establish branches, which 
might lead to measurement error in the dependent variable. 
19 The likelihood function is based on a Poisson process, although this can be modified; it involves taking 
the factorial of the dependent variable (noting that the factorial of zero is one).     16
important to control for the size of the population from which the counts are produced. In 
the Poisson or negative binomial distribution the rate of “arrival” is constant so that the 
number of arrivals depends on the population size. Increasing the population by a given 
percentage should increase the number of arrivals by the same percentage. To correct for 
this, we include the log of the number of banks to account for the size of the “at-risk 
population” of banks.
20 
Count data analysis has several advantages over other estimation strategies: it 
treats observations with the value of zero as containing important information and takes 
into account the granularity in the data (the fact that the number of exits and entries can 
only take on whole numbers). Moreover, since entries and exits are truncated at zero 
rather than censored at zero, using an alternative estimator such as Tobit would produce 
biased estimates. When there is some evidence of overdispersion (the variance 
significantly exceeds the mean) in our sample, we employ a negative binomial 
distribution rather than the Poisson distribution. The coefficients can be interpreted as the 
percentage change in the dependent variable (number of entries or exits) due to a one-unit 
change in the independent variable. 
Table 3 displays the results from cross-sectional regressions of the average 
number of mergers, voluntary liquidations, and entries from 1923 to 1930 on the ratio of 
branch offices for state and national banks to total branch and bank offices for state and 
national banks in 1922 (BRANCH) and the other explanatory variables described in 
equation 1. This specification enables us to examine whether cross-state variation is 
sufficient to identify a relationship between branching and our measures of exit. By 
holding our measure of branching at the 1922 level, we also alleviate concerns about the 
endogeneity of this variable. The estimated coefficients support the hypothesis that 
branch banking increases mergers and involuntary liquidations, leading to consolidation 
                                                 
20 For a detailed treatment of count data analysis see Cameron and Trivedi (1998).    17
in a state’s banking system. Testing these three coefficients jointly suggests that 
branching results in a net reduction of the number of banks (the Chi-squared test statistic 
has a p-value of 0.02). During the 1920s, states that had more extensive branch-banking 
networks had more voluntary liquidations than states that allowed only unit banking 
(Column 1). The point estimate suggests that an increase in the ratio branch offices to 
total offices by 0.1 (about one standard deviation) resulted in roughly a 50 percent 
increase in the number of voluntary liquidations. Column 2 also shows that states with 
more branching activity had significantly more mergers than unit banking states during 
the 1920s. The coefficient on the extent of branching suggests that its effect on the 
number of mergers is similar to its effect on voluntary liquidations. These results are 
consistent with White (1995), who describes the wave of bank mergers in the 1920s and 
suggests that the increase in mergers and the ability to branch may have been related. In 
contrast to the findings for voluntary liquidations and mergers, branching activity appears 
to have had little impact on entry by new national banks (Column 3).  
We next examine whether there is a sufficient expansion of branching activity in 
the early 1920s to induce exit as our hypothesis suggests. As appendix table 2 indicates, 
some states had passed branching laws before 1920. So even though the evidence from 
the tables and figures suggests that branching was expanding rapidly during the decade, 
in Table 4 we explicitly test whether the change in this branching ratio between 1922 and 
1925 is associated with a greater average number of mergers and voluntary liquidations 
between 1926 and 1930. The statistically significant coefficient on the change in the 
branching ratio shown in Columns 1 and 2 suggests that the expansion of branching in 
the early 1920s had a significant role in shaking out the banking system even though 
some branching laws had been passed earlier. 
The results from Tables 3 and 4 are also consistent with Wheelock (1993), who 
showed that the overall percentage change in banks per capita in the 1920s was greatest   18
in states where branching expanded the most.
21 However, the decomposition presented 
here provides the further insight that branching encouraged banks to exit in a variety of 
ways. That voluntary liquidations increased suggests that the decline in banks per capita 
was not simply due to widespread purchases of banks by a few industry leaders. Rather 
the trends exhibited in the regressions are consistent with an overall increase in 
competition where branching was permitted. 
We also estimated several alternative specifications in order to examine the 
robustness of the results, including pooling the data and using the legal status of 
branching in a state rather than the extent of branching. Table 5 tests whether the annual 
number of mergers, voluntary liquidations, and entries from 1923-1930 are related to 
level of branching activity lagged one year, where the data are pooled over the entire 
sample period.
22 The measure for the extent of branch banking in a state is lagged one 
year to reduce the potential for endogeneity.
23 We include year dummies in Table 5 (and 
in other pooled specifications in the paper) to control for any time-specific effects. This 
allows us to account for the changes in the macroeconomic environment and any residual 
effects of the changes in the regulatory environment, such as the McFadden Act, not 
captured by our degree of branching measures. The coefficients on the extent of 
branching are again positive and statistically significant at conventional levels for 
voluntary liquidations and mergers.  
As a final robustness test regarding the exogeneity of our branching variable, in 
place of the measure based on the extent of branching, we use dummy variables 
indicating whether the state permitted branch banking. In a pooled regression, we find 
that states permitting statewide branching had more mergers and consolidations (Table 
                                                 
21 And they are also consistent with Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), who show that the introduction of 
nationwide banking beginning in the 1980s accelerated the reduction in the number and market share of 
small bank organizations for the period of recent regulatory liberalization. 
22 There is, however, substantial variation over time in our measure of the extent of branching.  On average, 
it changes 75 percent between 1922 and 1930 and by 30 percent between 1926 and 1930. 
23 As we indicated in the previous section, since technological and legal changes were driving the increase 
in branch banking in the 1920s, the lagged measure of the extent of branching seems plausibly exogenous.   19
6). We note, however, that the rest of analysis in this article focuses on our preferred 
measure, the extent of branching activity in a particular state, because it allows us to 
sidestep two definitional problems which complicate and potentially muddle the 
interpretation of regression results based on the legal status of branching in a state: (1) 
some states in the 1920s permitted limited branching, but what they permitted differed 
markedly and (2) some states differed in terms of what was practiced by regulators (de 
facto) and what was on the books (de jure). (See Appendix Table 2 for more details.) 
 
B.  Consolidation and Increased Competition versus Monopoly Power 
  
Although the results presented in the previous section support the view that 
branch-banking activity increases mergers and exits, it is unclear whether this 
consolidation led to a more competitive banking system or to a monopolistic banking 
system. For example, when banks are forbidden from establishing branches, it artificially 
segments the market and enables unit banks to develop monopolies within particular 
localities. The immediate impact of branching is that it introduces competition into these 
geographically segmented markets. If banks that were previously insulated from the cool 
winds of competition are acquired or forced out of the market as a result of this increased 
competition, it is possible that the surviving banks in turn acquire monopoly power. This 
was one of the concerns of those who lobbied against more permissive branching laws in 
the 1920s: the end result of liberalization would simply be further concentration in the 
banking industry. To investigate further how statewide branching affects the competitive 
environment of a state’s banking system, we examine the relationship between branching 
and two additional measures: banking sector concentration and bank profits.   
  We first test whether states allowing branch banking had more concentrated 
banking sectors by regressing measures of bank concentration on the extent of branch 
banking. The first measure of concentration is essentially an annual Herfindahl index of   20
national banks. The Federal Reserve published data on the number of banks in different 
size categories with different levels of profitability for each state, for each of the years 
1926-1930 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors 1931).
24 The index is constructed as 
follows: the number of banks is multiplied by the means of the size category; these 
groups are aggregated to get the total value of loans and investments in the state. The 
mean of each size category is divided by total state assets, squared, and multiplied by the 
number of banks in each size category. These fractions are then added together to obtain 
the index.
25 Since the Federal Reserve data used to construct this index are only available 
for 1926-30, the results for the Herfindahl index are presented for this period. The second 
measure is a four-firm concentration ratio based on the deposits in the largest four 
commercial banks (state or national) in each state for each year of our sample. This 
measure allows us to examine a longer sample period (1923-1930) as well as a measure 
based on the liabilities of banks. The third measure is simply the number of banks per 
capita (both state and national commercial banks), also calculated for 1923-1930. The 
sample consists of annual observations on each state. 
Analysis using the ratio of branch offices to total bank offices of state and 
national banks in 1922 as our measure of branching indicates that states with more 
extensive branching had more concentrated banking sectors – higher Herfindahl scores, 
more deposits in the largest four banks, and fewer banks per capita.
26 We find similar 
                                                 
24 The size categories, based on loans and investments, are: category 1 - under $150,000; category 2 - 
$150,000-$250,000; category 3 - $250,000-$500,000; category 4 - $500,000-$750,000; category 5 - 
$750,000-$1,000,000; category 6 - $1,000,000-$2,000,000; category 7 - $2,000,000-$5,000,000; category 8 
- ($5,000,000-$10,000,000; category 9 - $10,000,000-$50,000,000; category 10 - $50,000,000 and over. 
We employ the profit information below. 




mean value of loans
banks in group











   
 
26 Our Herfindahl index is admittedly imperfect since it does not include state banks (comparable data do 
not exist), and state banks were on average smaller. The average assets (loans and investments) for state 
banks in 1926 was  $1,272,183 whereas for national banks it was $2,403,295; state banks had 57% of total 
assets in the commercial banking system in this year. Nevertheless, since our other two measures of   21
results if we pool the data and regress measures of bank concentration on the ratio of 
branch offices to total offices lagged one year (Table 7). Thus, regardless of the measure, 
states with more extensive branching tended to have more concentrated banking systems. 
  Next, we examine how branch banking affected bank profits. Since national banks 
were all regulated at the national level by the Office of the Comptroller of Currency and 
were largely restricted in their ability to have branches, differences in the level of 
competition that they faced would be a significant factor in creating differences in profit 
levels between states. Finding lower profits in states that witnessed a growth in branch 
banking would indicate that the national banks faced greater competition from state banks 
in these locations.
27   
  To test how branching laws affect profitability, we use profit data on national 
banks that are available from 1926-30 and that are decomposed by both size category 
(based on loans and investments) and by state. Rather than listing the actual profit rates, 
the Federal Reserve (1931) grouped the data into seven profit ranges, using the 
percentage return to capital as the measure of profitability.
28 The data set thus has up to 
70 observations per state, per year because there are 7 profit ranges for each of the 10 
bank size categories.
29 Because the ranges are ordered but the distance between them is 
not constant, an ordered logit is estimated using weights equal to the number of national 
banks in each size category s, state i, and year t, earning a given level of profits. We 
estimate the following function: 
                                                                                                                                                 
concentration also show that states with more branching activity had more concentrated banking systems, 
we are confident that our result is robust. 
27 Lower profitability may also result from higher merger costs; however, due to branching restrictions on 
nationally-chartered banks, this interpretation is more likely to apply to state banks than the national banks 
used in our sample. Alternatively, national banks may have higher profits if branching leads to so much 
industry consolidation that surviving banks are able to generate oligopoly profits.  Higher profits may also 
result if competition removes a sufficient number of inefficient national banks from the banking system.  
28 These ranges are: deficit of 6% or more, deficit of 5.9% to 0 %, profit of less than 3%, profit of 3% to 
5.9%, profit of 6% to 8.9%, profit of 9% to 11.9%, and profit of 12% and over. 
29 There may be less than 70 observations for a state within a year if none of the banks in a particular size 
category had profits within a particular profit range.   22
(3) PROFIT RANGEist = f{β1BRANCHit-1 + β2STBANKSHAREit + β3DEPINSi +ΣγsSIZEs}, 
 
with observations weighted by the number of national banks in category ist. 
STBANKSHARE is the share of commercial banks that are state chartered, DEPINS is a 
dummy variable indicating whether a state had a deposit insurance system, and YEAR and 
SIZE are time and size dummies, respectively. BRANCH is one of our two measures of 
the extent of branching. In Table 8, BRANCH is the ratio of branch offices to total bank 
offices of state and national banks in 1922 and in Table 9 BRANCH is the change in this 
branching ratio between 1922 and 1925.  
Tables 8 and 9 show that banks located in states with relatively more branching 
activity had declining profitability over the period 1926-30, suggesting that there was 
more competition in branch banking states.
30 A higher initial level of branching or a more 
significant expansion of branching in the early 1920s is found to have reduced 
profitability as competitive forces unleashed by branching likely eliminated the 
geographic monopolies enjoyed by unit banks and state banking systems moved toward a 
new equilibrium. This is shown in Tables 8 and 9 by the shift in the coefficient on 
branching from positive in the beginning of the sample period to negative by the end of 
the period. Depending on which measure of BRANCH we use, the effect on profits from 
branching turns negative in 1927 or 1928 and is significantly so starting in 1929.  Using 
the 1929 regression, a one-standard-deviation increase in the ratio of branch offices to 
total offices or a one-standard-deviation increase in the growth of branching reduces the 
probability of being in a higher profit category by 4 to 7 percent.      
  As a robustness check, we also considered a pooled regression specification 
(which includes year dummies) over the sample period 1926-30, and find that states with 
                                                 
30 Calomiris and Ramirez (2002) also find that states that prohibited branching had higher profit levels. 
They attribute this partly to the ability of unit banks to exert monopoly power and partly to the higher level 
of risk that being an undiversified unit bank would entail.   23
relatively more branching activity had lower profits (Table 10). We use our same 
measure of the extent of branch banking, but lag it one year. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the ratio of branch offices to total bank offices reduces the probability of 
being in a higher profit category by about 3 percent. While this overall effect is not 
terribly large, it masks different effects for different size banks. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in the ratio of branch offices to total bank offices for small banks, which seem to 
have been most affected by branching activity, reduced the probability of being in a 
higher category by 20 percent. For the largest banks, the probability of being in a higher 
category was reduced 10 percent. There seems to have been little effect on the 
profitability of mid-size banks. The other coefficients are as expected. Larger banks were 
more profitable, and the years 1929 and 1930 were particularly bad years for bank 
profitability. 
 The shift from positive profits to negative profits in later years suggest that the 
banking system was being transformed by the consolidation that branch banking brought 
with it. Our findings are consistent with studies of recent banking deregulation such as 
Amel and Liang (1997) and Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), who view the removal 
of geographic restrictions as likely reducing the exercise of market power (by unleashing 
more actual or potential customers into local markets) and improving allocative 
efficiency (by enabling resources to flow more easily toward activities that yielded higher 
returns and more efficient producers).  
 
C. Branch Banking and Financial Stability 
 
We now examine whether branch banking is responsible for lower national bank 
failures in the 1920s and 1930s. We consider two ways that branching may have reduced 
the incidence of failures: (1) by improving diversification opportunities through 
geographical expansion and (2) by weeding out weak banks via the process of   24
competition. We use the same data from the Federal Reserve that was used to examine 
bank profitability. Since the dependent variable we use is the number of failures, we 
estimate the regressions using count data analysis.  
We first verify that we are able to replicate the state-level results of Wheelock 
(1995) and Mitchener (2000a, 2004). We aggregate the size categories into state level 
observations and regress the number of failures of national banks in a state on variables 
indicating whether the state allowed branching, year dummies, and (log) number of banks 
in the state.
31 (We also include a specification that uses the extent of branching as an 
independent variable.) The results shown in Table 11 match the previous literature and 
indicate that states permitting branch banking had fewer bank failures from 1927-1930, 
the period where the profits regressions suggest that competition was most important.  
We now explore whether the lower number of failures from widespread branch 
banking was due to increased competition, diversification, or both. To conduct this test, 
we develop proxies for the competition and diversification effects of branch banking by 
taking advantage of the bifurcated nature of the U.S. banking system. To proxy how 
branch banking could lower failures by increasing consolidation, we compute the ratio of 
the branches of state banks to total bank offices in the state (COMPETITION). In states 
where this ratio is larger, national banks will be competing with more bank offices that 
are the direct result of statewide branching. And since this variable is based on the 
expansion of state-chartered branching, it excludes any benefits to national banks from 
greater diversification opportunities. To proxy for the diversification effects of branching 
on national banks, we compute both the percentage of national banks with branches 
(DIVERSIFY1) as well as ratio of national bank branches to national banks 
(DIVERSIFY2). In states where DIVERSIFY1 is larger, more national banks will have 
                                                 
31 We use a pooled sample. Following Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2002), we adjust the standard 
errors for the fact that there are multiple observations for each state by clustering at the state level. In states 
where the de jure situation differed from the de facto situation (such as West Virginia, where the laws 
allowed branching but the state banking commissioner refused all applications for establishing branches) or 
where states do not have a law, the de facto situation is used.   25
greater opportunities to diversify their portfolios across branch offices in the state. 
DIVERSIFY2 captures the extent to which national banks can diversify. Mathematically, 
these ratios are: 
 
 (4) COMPETITION =  
 
 
(5) DIVERSIFY1 =   
 
 
(6) DIVERSIFY2 =   
 
Including these measures side-by-side in regressions will allow us to identify which 
channel was quantitatively more important in lowering national bank failures. We use the 
1922 values for all three of theses ratios in order to ensure that they are plausibly 
exogenous.  
For state i, year t, and size category s, we estimate the total national bank failures 
(FAILURE) by the following function:  
 
(7) FAILUREist = f{β1COMPETITIONit-1 + β2DIVERSIFYit-1 + β4DEPINSi + β5BANKSit   
+ β4BUSFAILit-1 + β5FARMFAIit-1 + β6HERFt + ΣθiYEARt  
+ ΣγsSIZEs},  
 
where COMPETITION and DIVERSIFY are lagged, and DIVERSIFY is one of the two 
measures of diversification defined above (DIVERSIFY1 or DIVERSIFY2). Since our 
dependent variable is disaggregated by size, we are also able to include bank size 
indicators (SIZE) as additional conditioning variables – a factor that has been associated 
Branches of state banks 
Bank and branch offices of state and national banks 
Number of national banks with branches 
Number of national banks 
Branches of national banks 
Number of national banks   26
with the probability of failure in previous studies (Calomiris and Mason 2000, Carlson 
2004, White 1984).
32 Figure 4 shows the distribution of banks and failures by bank size 
category. To control for differences in real shocks across states, we include a measure of 
lagged business failures (BUSFAIL) and compute agricultural distress as the lagged farm 
failure rate (FARMFAIL). We control for additional state level factors: the (log) number 
of national banks (BANKS); the Herfindahl index (HERF), described above; and whether 
a state had a deposit insurance system (DEPINS).
33 All 48 states are used and we include 
year dummies to capture any time specific influences. Since each size category provides a 
unique observation, we have 10 observations for each state for each year.  
Since our profit regressions suggest that the initial shakeout and consolidation 
process had taken place by the end of 1926, we pool our data over the period 1927-30, 
and estimate equation (7) using count data analysis with a negative binomial 
distribution.
34 However, because we observe each state multiple times, we cluster our 
standard errors as suggested by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).
35  
The relative effects of competition and diversification in producing lower failures 
rates in states allowing branch banking are shown in Tables 12.
36 The negative and 
statistically significant estimated coefficient on our ratio that proxies for competition 
supports the hypothesis that branch banking improves financial stability by weeding out 
                                                 
32 Larger banks may be more stable because of their greater ability to spread risks and coordinate 
emergency assistance with other banks and their reduced propensity to spread contagion when the banking 
sector is subjected to external shocks. 
33 We include the deposit insurance indicator variable for two reasons. First, the presence of deposit 
insurance in eight states has been linked to higher failure rates in the 1920s in these states (Wheelock 1992, 
Wheelock and Wilson 1995, and Calomiris 1990). Moreover, increased competition can potentially 
exacerbate the moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance (Keeley 1990, Demzetz, Saidenberg 
and Strahan 1996, Hellman and Stiglitz 2000, Dick 2002, and Bergstresser 2002). There is however, little 
overlap between states that allowed branching and state that had a deposit insurance program. 
34 A few states have less than 10 observations per year because no banks exist in some size categories.  
35 As an alternative, we estimated a panel regression with state-level fixed effects and found similar effects.    
36 Branching and bank size are generally correlated, and both allow a bank to diversify: size allows the 
bank to make more total loans and branching permits the bank to make loans in different locations. In this 
analysis, we focus on the geographic diversification allowed by branching and control for bank size by 
including dummies for the size group of the bank. Another way of controlling for bank size is by repeating 
this regression using only banks of a particular size group. These regressions yield similar results to those 
shown here.    27
inefficient banks through increased competition and consolidation. Increased competition 
stemming from branching significantly reduces failures. An increase in the competition 
ratio of 0.1 (about one standard deviation) results in a 35 percent decrease in the number 
of failures in a state. On the other hand, we find no evidence that either of our measures 
for diversification resulting from branching is associated with fewer national bank 
failures, where column 1 of Table 12 uses DIVERSIFY1 (the percent of national banks 
with branches) and column 2 uses DIVERSIFY2 (average branches per national bank).  
These results do not appear to be sensitive to choosing a different measure of the 
extent of branching. As a sensitivity test, we use one-year lagged values of 
COMPETITION,  DIVERSIFY1, and DIVERSIFY2. Here again, the sign on 
COMPETITION is negative and statistically significant. We find no evidence that either 
of our measures for diversification resulting from branching is associated with fewer 
national bank failures; indeed, the only statistically significant coefficient for either of the 
diversification measures has the wrong expected sign. It should be noted however, that 
these results do not provide any indication about the importance of diversification 
through branching at state banks, where the bulk of the banking systems’ branches were 
located.  
The signs on the other explanatory variables in the failure regressions are largely 
as expected. Bank failures were significantly higher in 1929 and 1930 (as a result of the 
Depression). An increase in the banks at risk boosts failures. And consistent with the 
research using individual bank data from this period, larger banks were less likely to fail 
and smaller banks were more likely to fail.
37 After controlling for other factors, farm 
failure rates and deposit insurance were statistically insignificant. 
                                                 
37 We also tested an alternative hypothesis that branching decreases failures by facilitating a substitute to 
failure, namely merging with another bank. (We thank Joe Mason for suggesting this idea.) According to 
this view, branching reduces failures because it facilitates mergers by expanding the pool of possible 
merger partners from banks within the city to all state banks within the state. We test this hypothesis by 
constructing an index of the ease with which banks might merge. This index is the number of mergers 
divided by the total number of bank exits (mergers, failures, and voluntary liquidations). However, we do 
not find a significant relationship between this measure and the number of failures.   28
  California had by far the most branches, about 660 in 1926. New York had the 
second most with approximately 489 branches. As a test of the robustness of our results, 
we eliminate California from the sample and repeat the estimation. As Table 14 shows, 
the results are similar in terms of the effects that the two channels had on failures. 
Interestingly, both the size of effect of competition and its significance are greater when 
California is excluded from the sample. The same size increase in the ratio of branches of 
state banks to total bank offices (again about one-tenth of a standard deviation) now 
reduces the number of failures by about 60 percent. The reported coefficients on the other 
variables are quite similar to those shown in the previous table.  
To check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of stability measures, we also 
considered an alternative dependent variable – the share of assets at national banks 
affected by failures. The results (not reported) are similar to what is displayed in Tables 
10 and 11. States with more extensive state branching had a smaller share of assets 
located in failing national banks.  
 
Section 5. Conclusion 
 
This paper revises our understanding of the role that branching played in 
improving the stability of banking systems during the 1920s and 1930s. Diversification 
was not the primary channel through which branch banking made state banking systems 
more resistant to shocks. Instead, the expansion of statewide branch banking induced 
greater competition in states where it was permitted and improved the stability of their 
banking systems by removing weak and inefficient banks. Our results are largely 
consistent with recent literature that has examined the effects of deregulation in other 
settings. Like Amel and Liang (1997), who examine banks and branching in the 1980s, 
and Classens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (1998), who look at banks expanding 
internationally, we find that the growth of branch banking in the 1920s is associated with   29
lower profits in the latter part of the decade. Our results put the well-documented 
response of unit bankers (particularly those located in rural areas) to the growth of branch 
banking in the 1920s in proper perspective. Because the growth of statewide branching 
was eroding the monopoly profits that unit bankers had previously enjoyed, they 
responded (as predicted by the economic theory of regulation) by lobbying state and 
federal governments to legally limit it from spreading. As a result of their influence, 
many states consequently continued to prohibit branching during the 1920s. 
Similar to what Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) and Stiroh and Strahan (2003) find 
for the branching deregulation of the 1980s, we find that this more competitive 
atmosphere is associated with a higher exit rate. This confirms what some economic 
historians have suggested, but not shown. As White (1985, p.291) contends, “The number 
of small banks in rural areas needed to be reduced, and the mergers assisted the weaker 
institutions with less pain than the massive failures that followed. Unfortunately, this 
development was stifled by regulations in most states that forbade branch banking.” The 
market upheaval and increase in competition resulting from the removal of legal barriers 
to entry, however, resulted in longer-run stability, with fewer failures in states where 
branching had spread. Our results also confirm the hypothesis of Berger, Demsetz, and 
Strahan (1999), that competition prompts weaker banks to leave the banking system, and 
parallels the findings of Kaminsky and Schmuckler (2002), that international financial 
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Sources and notes: Federal Reserve Board (1931), vol. 2. Home city indicates branches located in the same 
city as the bank’s headquarters. 
 
Figure 2 
































Source: Federal Reserve Board (1943).   36
Figure 3 – Branches of National and State Banks outside the City of the Home Office (December 31, 1931) 
Source: Federal Reserve Board (1931, Vol. 2, p.17). 
Note: In California there are numerous branches in the metropolitan areas centering around San Francisco 
and Los Angeles, but technically outside their city limits. On the map the dots extend considerably beyond 
the territory in which the branches are actually located around these cities.   37


















Sources and Notes: Comptroller of the Currency (various years) and Federal Reserve Board (1931). Annual 
averages are constructed over the period 1926-1930. Size categories are: category 1 - under $150,000; 
category 2 - $150,000-$250,000; category 3 - $250,000-$500,000; category 4 - $500,000-$750,000; 
category 5 - $750,000-$1,000,000; category 6 - $1,000,000-$2,000,000; category 7 - $2,000,000-
$5,000,000; category 8 - ($5,000,000-$10,000,000; category 9 - $10,000,000-$50,000,000; category 10 - 
$50,000,000 and over. 
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Table 1 – The Distribution of Bank Branches by Town Population (1931) 
 
   Branches Outside 
Home-Office City 
Branches Inside Home-
Office City  All Branches 
Town Population  Number  Percent of 
Total  Number  Percent of 
Total  Number  Percent of 
Total 
Under 500  189 16.32 2 0.09 191 5.73
500-1,000 173 14.94 0 0.00 173 5.19
1,000-2,500 207 17.88 7 0.32 214 6.42
2,500-5,000 134 11.57 7 0.32 141 4.23
5,000-10,000 107 9.24 9 0.41 116 3.48
10,000-25,000 91 7.86 27 1.24 118 3.54
25,000-50,000 46 3.97 63 2.90 109 3.27
50,000-100,000 60 5.18 132 6.07 192 5.76
100,000+ 151 13.04 1929 88.65 2080 62.39
                    
Total 1158 100 2176 100 3334 100




Table 2 – Summary Statistics for National Banks 
   1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 Average
Number of states  30 30 28 28 28 29 30 29 28 29
Average number of 
banks  175.8 173.2 165.8 165.6 155.4 147.6 143.3 142.3 138.2 157.9
Average voluntary 
liquidation rate  1.4 1.7 1.8 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.2 3.5 4.7 2.2
Average mergers rate  1.2 2.0 1.8 2.2 1.9 2.3 2.2 3.5 4.0 2.1
Unit 
Banking 
Average entry rate  2.4 1.8 1.5 2.3 1.9 1.2 1.3 2.3 2.2 1.9
Number of states  18 18 20 20 20 19 18 19 20 19
Average number of 
banks  168.6 169.1 171.6 172.9 167.3 172.8 176.7 165.9 157.5 169.1
Average voluntary 
liquidation rate  1.8 1.5 2.6 1.6 3.4 2.0 2.8 4.0 4.9 2.6





Average entry rate  2.6 1.9 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.2 1.5 2.0 0.8 1.9
Sources and Notes: Rates are computed using data from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (1922-1930). Rates are expressed as percentages of existing banks. Within-category rates are 
unweighted averages of state rates. The last column shows the average of the yearly observations over the 
entire sample period, 1922-1930. 
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Table 3 – Effect of Initial Level of Branching on Voluntary Liquidations, Mergers, and Entry  
 
Dependent variable:  The average count of voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of national  





Liquidations  Average Mergers Average New 
Banks 
 -6.80***      -6.77***    -4.63***    
Intercept 
( 1.17)        ( 1.16)       ( 1.09)       
 5.02***      4.75***    1.47      Ratio of Branches to Total 
Bank Offices (1922 Value)  ( 1.56)        ( 1.54)       ( 1.66)       
 0.58**      1.26***    1.15***    
Banks Per Capita 
( 0.23)        ( 0.18)       ( 0.17)       
 0.03**      0.04**    0.00      Share of State Income from 
Agriculture  ( 0.02)        ( 0.02)       ( 0.02)       
 1.26***      1.26***    1.15***    
Log Number of Banks 
( 0.18)        ( 0.18)       ( 0.17)       
 -0.46       -0.49      0.83**    
Deposit Insurance 
( 0.39)        ( 0.38)       ( 0.40)       
 0.12       0.10      0.12    
Dispersion 
( 0.08)        ( 0.07)       ( 0.10)       
                              
Observations  48      48     48      
Log-Likelihood  -96.9        -91.1       -96.1       
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of 
national banks are from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1923-1930).  Population 
and income shares are from 1920 Census report. The log of the number of banks is the average number of 
national banks for 1923-1930.  Branch offices and total bank offices include both state and national banks.  40
Table 4 – Effect of an Increase in Branching on Voluntary Liquidations, Mergers, and Entry  
 
Dependent variable:  The average count of voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of national  
banks in a state for the period 1926-1930. 
   Average Voluntary 
Liquidations  Average Mergers
Average New 
Banks 
   (1926-1930) (1926-1930) (1926-1930) 
                              
   Count       Count       Count       
 -6.18***      -6.03***    -4.79***    
Intercept 
( 0.82)        ( 0.82)       ( 1.28)       
 6.62***      6.66***    3.15      Change in the Ratio of Branches to 
Total Bank Offices (1922-1925)  ( 1.03)        ( 1.03)       ( 2.48)       
 0.32       1.19***    1.13***    
Banks Per Capita 
( 0.23)        ( 0.13)       ( 0.23)       
 0.04***      0.04***    -0.01      Share of State Income from 
Agriculture  ( 0.01)        ( 0.01)       ( 0.02)       
 1.21***      1.19***    1.13***    
Log Number of Banks 
( 0.13)        ( 0.13)       ( 0.23)       
 -0.50*      -0.49*    1.39***    
Deposit Insurance 
( 0.26)        ( 0.26)       ( 0.50)       
 N.A.^         N.A.  ^        0.26    
Dispersion 
                       ( 0.17)       
                              
Observations  48      48     48      
Log-Likelihood  -165.9        -150.3       -48.4       
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  The symbol (^) indicates that we reject overdispersion in the data and estimate the regression 
using a Poisson distribution.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on voluntary liquidations, mergers, 
and entries of national banks are from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1926-1930).  
Population and income shares are from 1920 U.S. Census. Banks per capita is the 1920 value. The log of 
the number of banks is the average number of national banks for 1926-1930. Branch offices and total bank 
offices include both state and national banks.  41
Table 5 – Effect of Branching on Voluntary Liquidations, Mergers, and Entry using a Pooled Sample  
 
Dependent variable:  The count of voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of national  
banks in a state per year. 
   Voluntary 
Liquidations  Mergers New  Banks 
   (1923-1930) (1923-1930) (1923-1930) 
                              
                           
   -5.21***      -5.14***    -4.08***    
Intercept 
(  0.39)        ( 0.39)       ( 0.44)       
   2.41***      2.34***    0.51      Ratio of Branches to Total 
Bank Offices (lagged)  (  0.39)        ( 0.39)       ( 0.45)       
   0.66*      0.67*    -0.99***    
Banks Per Capita 
(  0.36)        ( 0.35)       ( 0.07)       
   0.04***      0.04***    0.00      Share of State Income from 
Agriculture  (  0.01)        ( 0.01)       ( 0.01)       
   1.01***      1.02***    1.07***    
Log Number of Banks 
(  0.06)        ( 0.06)       ( 0.07)       
   -0.72***      -0.69***    0.81***    
Deposit Insurance 
(  0.18)        ( 0.18)       ( 0.20)       
   0.20       0.01      -0.21     
1924 
(  0.19)        ( 0.19)       ( 0.21)       
   -0.02       -0.25      0.13     
1925 
(  0.20)        ( 0.20)       ( 0.20)       
   0.21        0.05       -0.08     
1926 
(  0.19)        ( 0.19)       ( 0.21)       
   0.25       0.18      -0.38*    
1927 
(  0.19)        ( 0.19)       ( 0.21)       
   0.19       0.04      -0.38*    
1928 
(  0.19)        ( 0.19)       ( 0.22)       
   0.59***      0.52***    -0.02     
1929 
(  0.19)        ( 0.18)       ( 0.21)       
   0.88***      0.55***    -0.27     
1930 
(  0.19)        ( 0.18)       ( 0.22)       
   0.39      0.39    0.54    
Dispersion 
(  0.06)        ( 0.06)       ( 0.08)       
                              
Observations  384      384     384      
Log-Likelihood  -1031        -964       -1086       
 Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of 
national banks are from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1922-1930).  Population 
and income shares are from 1920 Census report.  The first year in each sample period is the omitted year 
from the regression. Branch offices and total bank offices include both state and national banks.   42
Table 6 – Effect of State Branching Law on Voluntary Liquidations, Mergers, and Entry using a Pooled 
Sample  
 
Dependent variable:  The count of voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of national  
banks in a state per year. 
   Voluntary 
Liquidations  Mergers New  Banks 
   (1922-1930) (1922-1930) (1922-1930) 
                                
                           
 -4.64***      -4.79***    -3.87***    
Intercept 
( 0.40)        ( 0.41)       ( 0.43)       
 0.24*      0.21*    -0.10     
Law allows branching 
( 0.12)        ( 0.12)       ( 0.13)       
 -0.12       -0.04      -1.61***    
Banks Per Capita 
( 0.37)        ( 0.37)       ( 0.07)       
 0.03***      0.03***    0.00      Share of State Income from 
Agriculture  ( 0.01)        ( 0.01)       ( 0.01)       
 0.96***      0.99***    1.08***    
Log Number of Banks 
( 0.06)        ( 0.06)       ( 0.07)       
 -0.45**      -0.45**    0.96***    
Deposit Insurance 
( 0.19)        ( 0.19)       ( 0.19)       
 0.19       0.31      -0.06     
1923 
( 0.22)        ( 0.21)       ( 0.21)       
 0.38*      0.34      -0.28     
1924 
( 0.22)        ( 0.21)       ( 0.22)       
 0.18       0.09      0.05     
1925 
( 0.22)        ( 0.22)       ( 0.21)       
 0.40*       0.38*     -0.15     
1926 
( 0.22)        ( 0.21)       ( 0.22)       
 0.46**      0.55***    -0.45**    
1927 
( 0.21)        ( 0.21)       ( 0.22)       
 0.43**      0.43**    -0.45**    
1928 
( 0.22)        ( 0.22)       ( 0.22)       
 0.81***      0.89***    -0.09     
1929 
( 0.21)        ( 0.21)       ( 0.22)       
 1.07***      0.89***    -0.36     
1930 
( 0.21)        ( 0.21)       ( 0.22)       
 0.56      0.55    0.60    
Dispersion 
( 0.07)        ( 0.07)       ( 0.08)       
                                
Observations  480      480     480     
Log-Likelihood  -1065        -968       -1603       
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses. Data on voluntary liquidations, mergers, and entries of 
national banks are from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1922-1930). Data on 
branching laws are from the Federal Reserve Board (1931) and population is from the 1920 Census. The 
first year in each sample period is the omitted year from the regression.   43
Table 7 – Branching and Industry Concentration  
 
Dependent variable: concentration indexes 
   Herfindahl Index  4-Firm Index  Banks Per Capita 
   Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.    
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.    
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.   
Intercept 1084  ***  ( 101 )  0.21*** ( 0.02 )  38.61 ***  ( 2.44 )
Ratio of Branches to Total 
Bank Offices (lagged)  1088 ***  ( 301 )  0.44*** ( 0.06 )  -69.65 ***  ( 6.34 )
1924           0.01   ( 0.03 )  -2.18    ( 3.39 )
1925           0.02   ( 0.03 )  -3.07    ( 3.39 )
1926            0.02   ( 0.03 )  -4.20    ( 3.40 )
1927  60    ( 139)  0.03   ( 0.03 )  -5.31    ( 3.40 )
1928  50    ( 139)  0.04   ( 0.03 )  -6.27 *  ( 3.40 )
1929  101    ( 139)  0.04   ( 0.03 )  -6.97 **  ( 3.40 )
1930  150    ( 139)  0.05   ( 0.03 )  -7.98 **  ( 3.40 )
                        
Observations  239 383 383 
Adjusted R-square  0.04 0.14 0.25 
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. Estimated using a pooled sample. Data on the number of banks, size distribution, and number 
of branches are from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). Four-firm concentration index derived from Polk’s 
Bank Directory (various years) and the Comptroller of the Currency (various years). Population is from the 
1920 Census. The dummy for the first year in each time period is the omitted year. Banks per capita and the 
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Table 8 – Effect of Initial Level of Branching on Profitability by Year, 1926 - 1930 
 
Dependent variable: Profit level of banks in different size categories in a state for each year.  
   1926  1927  1928  1929  1930 
                             
 1.2***   0.6**   0.1    -0.4*   -1.1***  Ratio of Banks to Total 
Bank Offices (1922 value)  ( 0.2)     ( 0.2)     ( 0.2)  ( 0.2)     ( 0.2)    
 -1.7***   -2.5***   -1.9***  -0.8***   0.5***  Ratio of State Banks to Total
Banks  ( 0.1)     ( 0.2)     ( 0.2)  ( 0.2)     ( 0.2)    
 -0.4***   -0.1**   0.3***  0.2***   0.3** 
Deposit Insurance 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 -1.6***   -1.5***   -1.6***  -1.1***   -0.8*** 
Size Category 1 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 -1.1***   -0.9***   -0.9***  -0.7***   -0.5*** 
Size Category 2 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 -0.6***   -0.6***   -0.5***  -0.3***   -0.1** 
Size Category 3 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 -0.2***   -0.2***   -0.1**   -0.1    0.0  
Size Category 4 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 -0.1*   -0.1    -0.1    -0.2***   0.0  
Size Category 5 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 0.2***   0.1    0.2***  0.3***   0.2** 
Size Category 7 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 0.2    0.2*   0.3**   0.3***   0.4*** 
Size Category 8 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 0.2*   0.2    0.3**   0.6***   0.6*** 
Size Category 9 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 0.2    0.0    0.7**   1.1***   1.0*** 
Size Category 10 
( 0.3)     ( 0.3)     ( 0.3)  ( 0.3)     ( 0.3)    
 -0.3***   0.2*   -0.2**   -1.1***   -2.8*** 
Intercept 7 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 0.7***   1.2***   0.8***  -0.1    -1.9*** 
Intercept 6 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 1.8***   2.3***   1.9***  0.9***   -0.9*** 
Intercept 5 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 2.7***   3.1***   2.8***  1.8***   0.2  
Intercept 4 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 3.4***   3.8***   3.5***  2.5***   0.9*** 
Intercept 3 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
 4.4***   4.8***   4.4***  3.6***   2.1*** 
Intercept 2 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)    
                                           
Observations 1752    1781    1737  1715    1697     
Log-Likelihood  -13750     -13634     -13406  -13342     -12962    
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Estimated using an ordered logit. Deposit insurance data are from Calomiris (1992) and 
White (1981).  All other information is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). The dependent variable is 
an ordered variable indicating the level of profitability weighted by the number of banks that reported 
earning that level of profits. Size category 6 is omitted.   45
Table 9 – Effect of Growth of Branching on Profitability by Year, 1926 - 1930 
 
Dependent variable: Profit level of banks in different size categories in a state for each year.  
   1926  1927  1928  1929  1930 
                       
 2.5***   -0.3    -0.9    -2.1***   -2.1***  Change in Ratio of Branching to 
Total Bank Offices (1922-1925)  ( 0.6)     ( 0.7)     ( 0.7)  ( 0.7)  ( 0.7) 
 -1.8***   -2.6***   -2.0***  -0.9***   0.5***  Ratio of State Banks to Total 
Banks  ( 0.1)     ( 0.2)     ( 0.2)  ( 0.2)  ( 0.2) 
 -0.4***   -0.2***   0.2***  0.2***   0.3** 
Deposit Insurance 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 -1.6***   -1.5***   -1.6***  -1.1***   -0.8*** 
Size Category 1 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 -1.1***   -1.0***   -0.9***  -0.7***   -0.5*** 
Size Category 2 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 -0.6***   -0.6***   -0.5***  -0.3***   -0.1* 
Size Category 3 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 -0.2***   -0.2***   -0.1**   -0.1    0.0  
Size Category 4 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 -0.1*   -0.1    -0.1    -0.2***   0.0  
Size Category 5 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 0.2***   0.1    0.2***  0.3***   0.2*** 
Size Category 7 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 0.2    0.2*   0.3**   0.3***   0.4*** 
Size Category 8 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 0.2*   0.2    0.3**  0.6***   0.6*** 
Size Category 9 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 0.2    0.1    0.7**   1.1***   1.0*** 
Size Category 10 
( 0.3)     ( 0.3)     ( 0.3)  ( 0.3)  ( 0.3) 
 -0.3***   0.3***   -0.2    -1.0***   -2.9*** 
Intercept 7 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 0.8***   1.3***   0.8***  -0.1    -2.0*** 
Intercept 6 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 1.8***   2.4***   2.0***  1.0***   -0.9*** 
Intercept 5 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 2.7***   3.3***   2.8***  1.9***   0.1  
Intercept 4 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 3.4***   4.0***   3.5***  2.6***   0.9*** 
Intercept 3 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
 4.4***   4.9***   4.5***  3.7***   2.1*** 
Intercept 2 
( 0.1)     ( 0.1)     ( 0.1)  ( 0.1)  ( 0.1) 
                                       
Observations (weighted)  1752    1781    1737  1715  1697 
Log-Likelihood  -14369     -14101     -13758  -13511  -13070 
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Estimated using an ordered logit. Deposit insurance data are from Calomiris (1992) and 
White (1981).  All other information is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). The dependent variable is 
an ordered variable indicating the level of profitability weighted by the number of banks that reported 
earning that level of profits. Size category 6 is omitted. 
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Table 10 – Branching and Profitability, 1926 - 1930 
 
Dependent variable: Profit level of banks in different size categories in a state and by year.  
   Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.    
Ratio of Branches to 
Total Bank Offices 
(lagged) 
-0.19 ***  ( 0.07 ) 
Ratio of State Banks to 
Total Banks  -1.29 ***  ( 0.06 ) 
Deposit Insurance  -0.16 ***  ( 0.03 ) 
Size Category 1  -1.36 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Size Category 2  -0.84 ***  ( 0.04 ) 
Size Category 3  -0.45 ***  ( 0.03 ) 
Size Category 4  -0.15 ***  ( 0.03 ) 
Size Category 5  -0.12 ***  ( 0.04 ) 
Size Category 7  0.19 ***  ( 0.03 ) 
Size Category 8  0.27 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Size Category 9  0.35 ***  ( 0.06 ) 
Size Category 10  0.62 ***  ( 0.13 ) 
1927 -0.02      ( 0.03 ) 
1928 0.03      ( 0.03 ) 
1929 -0.13  ***  ( 0.03 ) 
1930 -0.93  ***  ( 0.03 ) 
Intercept 7  -0.59 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Intercept 6  0.38 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Intercept 5  1.43 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Intercept 4  2.34 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Intercept 3  3.07 ***  ( 0.05 ) 
Intercept 2  4.12 ***  ( 0.06 ) 
           
Observations   8640 
Log-Likelihood  -69460 
 
 Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Estimated using an ordered logit and pooled observations. Deposit insurance data are from 
Calomiris and White. All other information is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). The dependent 
variable is an ordered variable indicating the level of profitability weighted by the number of banks that 
reported earning that level of profits. Size category 6 and the year 1928 are also omitted.   47
Table 11 – The Effects of Branching Laws on National Bank Failures, 1927 - 1930 
 
Dependent Variable:  Number of failing banks in a state in a year 
   Legal Environment  Actual Branches  
                  
  
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.    
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.    
Intercept -2.84***  ( 0.89 )  -2.79***  ( 0.62 ) 
Branch Banking 
Permitted  -0.79***  ( 0.21 )         
Ratio of Branches to 
Total Bank Offices 
(1922 value)          
-4.46***  ( 1.28 ) 
Log Banks  0.65***  ( 0.11 )  0.63***  ( 0.11 ) 
1928 -0.17   ( 0.30 )  -0.16   ( 0.30 ) 
1929 0.16  ( 0.29 )  0.16  ( 0.29 ) 
1930 1.07***  ( 0.26 )  1.04   ( 0.27 ) 
Dispersion 0.87  ( 0.20 )  0.91  ( 0.20 ) 
                      
Observations  192 192 
Log-Likelihood  -8.2 -7.8 
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  Estimated using pooled data and count data analysis with a negative binomial distribution.  
Information on bank failures is from the Annual Report of the Comptroller. Information on the number of 
banks and branching laws is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931).  The dummy for the year 1926 is 
omitted. 
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Table 12 – Effects of Initial Level of Branching on National Bank Failures, 1927 - 1930 
 
Dependent Variable:  Average number of failing banks in each group 
(where a group is a set of banks in a similar size category in a state)   
   With Number of National 
Banks with Branches 
With Number of National Bank 
Branches 
            
  
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.     
Coefficient 
Estimate S.E.     
Ratio of Branches of State 
Banks to Total Bank Offices 
(1922 value) 
-3.46*  ( 2.09  )  -3.40*  ( 2.08  ) 
Share of National Banks with 
Branches (1922 value)  -8.00   ( 14.59  )         
Ratio of National Branches to 
National Banks (1922 value)      
 
-2.94   ( 4.78  ) 
Log Banks  0.57***  ( 0.11  )  0.57***  ( 0.11  ) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.15   ( 1.68  )  0.10   ( 1.80  ) 
Business Fail Rate  0.00   ( 0.38  )  -0.03   ( 0.37  ) 
Farm Failure Rate  23.84   ( 102.09 )  29.67   ( 100.39 ) 
Deposit Insurance  0.38   ( 0.35  )  0.35   ( 0.33  ) 
Size Category 1  0.68*  ( 0.38  )  0.70*  ( 0.38  ) 
Size Category 2  0.59*  ( 0.30  )  0.59**  ( 0.30  ) 
Size Category 3  0.78***  ( 0.21  )  0.78***  ( 0.22  ) 
Size Category 4  0.16   ( 0.25  )  0.16   ( 0.25  ) 
Size Category 5  -0.51   ( 0.38  )  -0.51   ( 0.37  ) 
Size Category 7  -0.61   ( 0.38  )  -0.61   ( 0.38  ) 
Size Category 8  -1.31***  ( 0.51  )  -1.30***  ( 0.51  ) 
Size Category 9  -1.75**  ( 0.85  )  -1.74**  ( 0.85  ) 
Size Category 10  -18.12***  ( 0.55  )  -18.09***  ( 0.55  ) 
1928 -0.29    ( 0.27  )  -0.29   ( 0.27  ) 
1929 0.05    ( 0.27  )  0.05   ( 0.28  ) 
1930 1.06***  ( 0.26  )  1.06***  ( 0.26  ) 
constant -3.52***  ( 0.74  )  -0.61   ( 4.77  ) 
                    
Observations  1614 1613 
Log-Likelihood  -665.7 -665.6 
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. Estimated using a negative binomial distribution.  Standard errors are clustered to account for 
multiple observations from the same state.  Data on bank failures are from the Annual Report of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (1932). Data on the number of bank, size distribution, branching laws, and 
number of branches is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). Business failure rates are from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and farm foreclosures from the Department of Agriculture (1936). Deposit 
insurance data are from Calomiris (1992) and White (1981). Size category 6 and the year 1927 are omitted. 
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Table 13 – Effects of Branching on National Bank Failures using lagged branching, 1927 - 1930 
 
Dependent Variable:  Number of failing banks in each group 
(where a group is a set of banks in a similar size category in a state and by year)   
   With Number of National 
Banks with Branches 
With Number of National 
Bank Branches 
            
  
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.     
Coefficient 
Estimate S.E.     
Ratio of Branches of State 
Banks to Total Bank Offices  -3.64**  ( 1.61  )  -3.92**  ( 1.72  ) 
Share of National Banks with 
Branches  1.77   ( 2.93  )         
Ratio of National Branches to 
National Banks     
 
0.36   ( 0.24  ) 
Log Banks  0.57***  ( 0.11  )  0.56***  ( 0.11  ) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.18   ( 1.71  )  -0.40   ( 1.77  ) 
Business Fail Rate  -0.08   ( 0.37  )  -0.10   ( 0.38  ) 
Farm Failure Rate  33.5   ( 98.6  )  23.6   ( 98.2  ) 
Deposit Insurance  0.32   ( 0.33  )  0.31   ( 0.33  ) 
Size Category 1  0.69*  ( 0.38  )  0.67*  ( 0.38  ) 
Size Category 2  0.59*  ( 0.31  )  0.57*  ( 0.31  ) 
Size Category 3  0.77***  ( 0.22  )  0.77***  ( 0.22  ) 
Size Category 4  0.15   ( 0.25  )  0.15   ( 0.25  ) 
Size Category 5  -0.52   ( 0.38  )  -0.52   ( 0.38  ) 
Size Category 7  -0.62   ( 0.38  )  -0.63*  ( 0.38  ) 
Size Category 8  -1.30**  ( 0.51  )  -1.32***  ( 0.51  ) 
Size Category 9  -1.76**  ( 0.85  )  -1.77**  ( 0.85  ) 
Size Category 10  -17.60***  ( 0.56  )  -17.64***  ( 0.55  ) 
1928 -0.28    ( 0.27  )  -0.30   ( 0.27  ) 
1929 0.06    ( 0.28  )  0.03   ( 0.28  ) 
1930 1.08***  ( 0.26  )  1.05***  ( 0.26  ) 
constant -3.50***  ( 0.73  )  -3.71***  ( 0.71  ) 
                    
Observations  1613 1613 
Log-Likelihood  -656.0 -655.5 
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. Estimated using a pooled sample and a negative binomial distribution.  Standard errors are 
clustered to account for multiple observations from the same state.  Data on bank failures are from the 
Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1932). Data on the number of bank, size distribution, 
branching laws, and number of branches is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). Business failure rates 
are from the U.S. Department of Commerce and farm foreclosures from the Department of Agriculture 
(1936). Deposit insurance data are from Calomiris (1992) and White (1981). Size category 6 and the year 
1927 are also omitted.   50
Table 14 – Effects of Initial Level of Branching on National Bank Failures excluding California, 1927 - 
1930 
 
Dependent Variable:  Average number of failing banks in each group 
(where a group is a set of banks in a similar size category in a state)   
   With Number of National Banks 
with Branches 
With Number of National Bank 
Branches 
              
  
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.     
Coefficient 
Estimate   S.E.     
Ratio of Branches of State 
Banks to Total Bank Offices 
(1922 value) 
-5.96***  ( 2.15  )  -6.35***  ( 2.29 ) 
Share of National Banks with 
Branches (1922 value)  -6.76   ( 16.40  )         
Ratio of National Branches to 
National Banks (1922 value)     
 
-0.40   ( 4.82 ) 
Log Banks  0.54***  ( 0.11  )  0.54***  ( 0.11 ) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.21   ( 1.69  )  -0.13   ( 1.80 ) 
Business Fail Rate  -0.08   ( 0.38  )  -0.10   ( 0.37 ) 
Farm Failure Rate  6.69   ( 103.47  )  13.17   ( 102.09 ) 
Deposit Insurance  0.34   ( 0.35  )  0.31   ( 0.33 ) 
Size Category 1  0.66*  ( 0.39  )  0.67*  ( 0.39 ) 
Size Category 2  0.53*  ( 0.31  )  0.54*  ( 0.31 ) 
Size Category 3  0.79***  ( 0.22  )  0.79***  ( 0.22 ) 
Size Category 4  0.15   ( 0.26  )  0.15   ( 0.26 ) 
Size Category 5  -0.49   ( 0.38  )  -0.49   ( 0.38 ) 
Size Category 7  -0.65   ( 0.40  )  -0.65*  ( 0.40 ) 
Size Category 8  -1.30**  ( 0.51  )  -1.30**  ( 0.51 ) 
Size Category 9  -1.75**  ( 0.86  )  -1.74**  ( 0.86 ) 
Size Category 10  -17.83***  ( 0.58  )  -18.10***  ( 0.59 ) 
1928 -0.29    ( 0.28  )  -0.28   ( 0.27 ) 
1929 0.06    ( 0.28  )  0.06   ( 0.29 ) 
1930 1.06***  ( 0.27  )  1.06***  ( 0.27 ) 
constant -3.27***  ( 0.75  )  -2.90   ( 4.80 ) 
                      
Observations  1573 1573 
Log-Likelihood  -635.4 -635.6 
Note. The symbols (***), (**), and (*) indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively. Estimated using a negative binomial distribution.  Standard errors are clustered to account for 
multiple observations from the same state.  Data on bank failures are from the Annual Report of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (1932). Data on the number of bank, size distribution, branching laws, and 
number of branches is from the Federal Reserve Board (1931). Business failure rates are from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and farm foreclosures from the Department of Agriculture (1936). Deposit 
insurance data are from Calomiris (1992) and White (1981). Size category 6 and the year 1927 are omitted. 
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Appendix Table 1. Data Sources  
 
Two main sets of data are employed.  The first consists of state-level aggregate 
data on national banks, covering the period 1922-1930. These data are used to compare 
the prevalence of entry and exits between states with different branching regimes.   
Information on number of banks, mergers, voluntary liquidations, and new banks are 
compiled using the Annual Report of the Comptroller of the Currency (1922-1930).   
 
  The second contains additional information on national banks in each state 
between 1926 and 1930. These data are drawn from the Federal Reserve Board of 
Governors’ (1931) Report on Branch, Chain and Group Banking, Volume 9: Bank Profits 
and further categorize banks by size (based on the sum of loans and investments). This 
source also includes the information on bank profits by size category. Data from this 
Federal Reserve report are also used for the construction of the Herfindahl index of 
banking concentration. The four-firm bank concentration index is calculated using data 
on the four largest national banks in each state from Polk’s Bank Directory (various 
years). 
 
Bank failures for 1926-1930 are taken from the Annual Report of the Comptroller 
of the Currency (1932, table 43, pp.208-28) and the Comptroller of the Currency’s 
Statements of National Banks (1925-1929), and are matched to the appropriate size 
category for the appropriate state using the information contained in Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors (1931).  
 
  State bank data are matched to branching laws and to indicators of state economic 
activity. Information on the branching laws for each state are from the Federal Reserve’s 
Report on Branch, Chain and Group Banking, Volume 2: Branch Banking in the United 
States. This reports the developments in each state’s branch banking laws from 1909 until 
1931. Detailed information on state branching laws (including whether the de jure rather 
than the de facto situation was used) is shown in Appendix Table 2. Information on 
Deposit Insurance follows Calomiris (1992) and White (1981). Business failures and 
population estimates are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States (various years). Farm foreclosure (bankruptcies) rates are computed 
using data from U.S. Department of Agriculture (1936) while income shares are derived 
from the 1920 Census.   52
Appendix Table 2. Branch Banking Laws 
 
State Type  Year Law 
Passed  Notes 
           
Alabama  Unit  1911  A few banks have branches 
Arizona  Statewide  1901  Branching had been practiced before law came into effect 
Arkansas  Unit  1923  State commissioner authorizes a few "exceptions" 
California  Statewide  1909  Branching had been practiced before law came into effect 
Colorado Unit  1909     
Connecticut Unit  1902     
Delaware  Statewide  1895  If charter allows 
Florida Unit  1913     
Georgia Multiple  1929  Branching allowed until 1927, banned until 1929 when it is permitted in 
Savannah and Atlanta 
Idaho Unit  1919     
Illinois  Unit  1923  Prior to 1923, branches had been "not authorized" 
Indiana Unit  1921     
Iowa  Unit  1927  Prior to 1927, branches had been "not authorized" 
Kansas  Unit*  1929  Law against it enacted in 1929.  Previously there was no law. 
Kentucky Statewide*  1895 
In 1902 the banking authority stated that law did not authorize, but "was 
not construed as prohibitive."  In 1909 the courts say the banks can't have 
branches but can have "offices to receive deposits and pay checks or 
transact other necessary duties not requiring special discretion or business 
acumen."  Observers at the time noted little difference between these 
agencies and branches. 
Louisiana  Limited  1902  2 branches in the same parish 
Maine  Limited  1895  Only in the county of the home office or contiguous counties. 
Maryland  Statewide  1910  Branching had been practiced before law came into effect 
Massachusetts Limited 1928  Trusts can have branches in the same city, prior to 1928 were limited to 
one branch 
Michigan Limited*  1895  No law, but a lot of branches in the city of the home office 
Minnesota Unit  1923     
Mississippi  Limited  1924  Prior to 1924, the law had prohibited branches 
Missouri Unit  1899     
Montana Unit  1927  No law prior to 1927 
Nebraska Unit  1927  No law prior to 1927 
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Appendix Table 2, continued  
 
Nevada Unit  1909     
New Hampshire  Unit*  1895  Commissioner reported that he was not aware of any law prohibiting or 
allowing branching. 
New Jersey  Limited  1895    
New Mexico  Unit  1915 
Allows "mercantile corporation which maintains a banking department to 
continue operations at its branches." A clause in the law specifically for a 
particular corporation. 
New York  Limited  1919  Branching within cities of 50,000 
North Carolina  Statewide  1921  Branching had been practiced before law came into effect 
North Dakota  Unit*  1895  Branches were not specifically mentioned, but the law was construed as 
not permitting them.  
Ohio  Limited  1923  In contiguous communities 
Oklahoma Unit*  1895  No law 
Oregon Unit  1921     
Pennsylvania Limited  1927  Branches are only permitted in places where national banks have 
branches already. Prior to 1927, it had been in  home office-city only. 
Rhode Island  Statewide  1908    
South Carolina  Statewide*  1895  No law per se, but instead what the capital requirements would be should 
the bank have branches 
South Dakota  Unit*  1895  No law 
Tennessee  Limited*  1925  Law unclear, seems to be allowed in the county of the home office 
Texas Unit  1905     
Utah Unit  1917     
Vermont Multiple  1929  Went from "not authorized" to able to establish "agencies" which are 
branches in all but name 
Virginia  Multiple  1928  In 1922 authorized for anywhere, in 1928 restricted to cities of 50,000. 
Washington Unit  1920     
West Virginia  Unit*  1929  Technically allowed by law from 1925-1929, however the commissioner 
of banking did not permit them. 
Wisconsin Unit  1909     
Wyoming Multiple  1926 
Law of 1921 has banks articles of incorp. (AoI) state the "place or places 
where its offices be located," while the 1926 law has the AoI state the 
"place where its office..." 
Note: All types are as indicated by law (de jure) except were indicated by a * in which case the de facto 
type is used.  Please consult the table for the reason the de jure is not used. 
Source. Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1931), Report of the Branch, Chain, and Group Banking 
Committee, Volume 9. 